Showing posts with label J. Peter Pham. Show all posts
Showing posts with label J. Peter Pham. Show all posts

Wednesday, 5 March 2008

The U.S. and Somaliland: A Strategic Guide to Partnership

J. Peter Pham

By J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.

28 Feb 08

A great deal has transpired in the little over two months since I last raised the question of Somaliland in this column, repeating a call I made two years earlier: "Since the disintegration of the Siyad Barre's oppressive Somali regime into Hobbesian anarchy and warlordism, the international community has staunchly defended the phantasmal existence of the fictitious entity known as 'Somalia.' Now, however, is the time for the United States to break ranks and let realism triumph over wishful thinking, not only recognizing, but actively supporting Somaliland, a brave little land whose people's quest for freedom and security mirrors America's values as well as her strategic interests."

In January, the president of the Republic of Somaliland, Dahir Rayale Kahin, accompanied by his foreign minister, Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, and several other members of his cabinet were invited to Washington for a visit that was officially acknowledged by the U.S. Department of State. According to the statement from the department's spokesman, Ambassador Sean McCormack:

A high-level delegation from Somaliland, led by President Dahir Kahin Rayale, departed Washington January 19 after an eight-day visit. While here, the delegation met with senior officials of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense, and National Security Council staff, among others. This cordial and constructive visit demonstrated U.S. engagement with Somaliland in furtherance of our common interests in the areas of regional peace and security, economic development, and democratic reform.

Barely two weeks later, on February 3, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, arrived in Somaliland's capital, Hargeysa, with Ambassador John M. Yates, a veteran diplomat based in Nairobi, Kenya, who is America's special envoy for Somalia (the U.S. envoy to Ethiopia, Ambassador Don Yamamoto, preceded the pair by one day). Dr. Frazer, the highest-ranking U.S. official to set foot in the republic since it reasserted its independence in 1991, spent the day holding formal talks with top government officials as well as meeting privately with representatives of Somaliland's three registered political parties – the Union of Democrats (UDUB), the Peace, Unity, and Development Party (KULMIYE), and the Party of Justice (UCID) – and the unregistered "Qaran" political movement. Speaking to the press, Dr. Frazer explained the motivation of her visit:

Our visit to Somaliland is in connection and follow-up to President Dahir Rayale Kahin's recent, visit, to Washington and on top of that to continue to work with the Somaliland authorities in the issues concerning peace, stability and security of the region. Our visit is also an acknowledgement of the democratic progress made by Somaliland ... the U.S. assisted Somaliland in past elections and will continue to do so in the coming elections. We are here, today, to show our support for this and to mark the friendship and cooperation existing between the two countries.

A few days after Dr. Frazer's visit, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) announced that it would "expand substantially activities designed to improve the lives of citizens of Somaliland," pledging "resources amounting to twice those spent in 2007 will be spent on projects focusing on the rule of law and security, democratic governance and on recovery and sustainable livelihoods, as well as on additional staff to increase the range of the ambitious programme in different regions of Somaliland" in concert "with the Somaliland government and other UN agencies."

Dr. Frazer was careful to emphasize that the recent flurry of activity did not imply diplomatic recognition was imminent, noting that while "we have said on many occasions that the U.S. will continue to work with Somaliland, in particular, in the strong democratic values which Somaliland has succeeded in implementing," the issue of recognition should be left to the African Union (AU), while America would "work with the AU and will respect whatever decision it makes on Somaliland's status." However, as I previously observed, while the AU's own report on the matter, presented by then-Deputy Chairperson Patrick Kayumbu Mazimhaka, acknowledged the uniqueness of the case – "The fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland's search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's Box'. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case" – the AU is simply unable to actually address the matter as long as it continues to seat the utterly ineffectual "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG) of Somalia, which asserts sovereignty over the entire territory of the defunct Somali Democratic Republic despite being unable to so much as safely police its putative capital. Since Dr. Frazer is, undoubtedly, well aware of this reality, what is one to make of the recent developments?

In large measure, the recent engagement can be viewed as strategically sound at several levels. In the short term, it is increasingly apparent that the TFG's lease on life is perhaps even more tenuous than that of its "president," Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, who, until last week, had not been in Somalia for months and was evacuated to London from Nairobi last month for medical treatment. In fact, just to get him back into Mogadishu last week, TFG forces and their Ethiopian protectors sealed all roads from the airport to the presidential Villa Somalia. In response, Islamist and clan insurgents fighting the regime fired mortars at the bunkered-down peacekeepers of the undermanned African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and, for good measure, lobbed half a dozen shells into the presidential compound. Amid heavy fighting last week, TFG forces sealed off the famed Bakara market, compounding the woes of those residents of Mogadishu who have not fled since most of these people either earn their living at the market or depend on it for basic staples. Typical of the constant hit-and-run attacks by the insurgents, last Saturday at least four Ethiopian soldiers were killed when the water truck they were traveling in drove into an ambush in northern Mogadishu while, in the Wadajir district just south of the capital, gunmen shot and wounded a local government official as he stood in front of his house. On Sunday, heavily-armed insurgents from the radical al-Shabaab ("the Youth") wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), reportedly led by Sheikh Muhktar Ali Robow, a.k.a., Abu Mansur, the former deputy defense minister of the ICU who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan, briefly occupied the southern town of Dinsoor before withdrawing. With daily rounds of artillery duels, bombings, ambushes, assassinations, and incursions, no one seriously believes that even the full deployment of AMISOM – an unlikely occurrence in any event – would do much more than prolong the agony of the passing of the TFG, the fourteenth attempt by outsiders to restore central government to what was once Somalia. Hence it makes perfect sense for U.S. officials to reach out to any effective powers in the region.

Over the longer term, given the apparent futility trying to reconstitute a unitary state – a point I made more than a year ago in this column space – the members of the international community, especially the United States and its allies, have every reason to seek to engage Somaliland, not least of which is its geopolitical significance as a Muslim country with authentic democratic aspirations controlling over 900 kilometers of coastline along sea lanes along the Gulf of Aden, just opposite the Arabian Peninsula. Having such an island of relative security and stability is all the more important when, as veteran Somalia scholar Dr. Ken Menkhaus of Davidson College, who served as a senior advisor to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the 1990s, has noted, "a collapsed state such as Somalia is more likely to serve as niche role as a transit zone, through which men, money, or materiel are quickly moved into the country and then across borders of neighboring states." Moreover, there is the belated recognition in many quarters, of the validity of the warning which South African analyst Kurt Schillinger delivered in a paper for the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies (RUSI): " Somaliland is a fragile entity in a fragile region with large Islamic populations – all demonstrably susceptible to radicalization."

However, just because a consensus is slowly being built around these two realizations does not mean that the United States will extend formal diplomatic recognition to Somaliland any time soon despite the consonance of the admirable efforts by its people to build a secure and democratic state for themselves to the vision which President George W. Bush outlined in his second inaugural address: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world ... Our goal ... is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way." Rather, while the commonality of ideals provides a basis for moving forward, Realpolitik dictates that not just ideals, but concrete national interests must be carefully considered if a great power like the United States is going to break new ground and recognize an aspiring state like Somaliland. In other words, as much as I have been a consistent advocate for Somaliland – just last week I gave an address at the University of Baltimore School of Law entitled "The Case for the Republic of Somaliland: At the Frontiers of International Law, African Politics, and Territorial Order" – I cannot foresee recognition from Washington unless the government in Hargeysa convinces skeptics that there is substantial "value added" in the relationship.

To this end, the following are some steps which President Kahin and his government might take to build upon the recent progress in ties with the United States with a view to eventually securing formal recognition of what their citizens have accomplished in building a nation out of the wreckage of the former Somalia:

First, one cannot understate the importance of the presidential election scheduled for August 2008: it must be a model of free, fair, and transparent balloting. One of the most important claims that Somaliland makes on the attention of the international community is its democratic politics. While the 2005 elections for the House of Representatives marked a significant milestone in that the incumbent president's UDUB won only 33 seats in the 82-member legislature (KULMIYE and UCID won 28 and 21 seats, respectively), following this up with a successful second direct democratic presidential vote (the first took place in 2003), would truly confirm Somaliland's status in the company of emerging democracies. The United States has provided over $1 million to the International Republican Institute (IRI) to support training and other programs in preparation for the elections, while the State Department expects to make an additional $1.5 million available after the voting. The European Union is likewise providing financial assistance for the electoral exercise.

Second, beyond the voting, Somaliland must continue making progress on democratic governance. The territory is characterized a "partly free," scoring 5 on political rights and 4 on civil liberties in Freedom House's annual report, Freedom in the World 2008 (the scale is 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to the highest and 7 the lowest levels of freedom). While the scores are impressive in contrast to that of the countries in its neighborhood – Somalia scores an abysmal 7 on both indices, Ethiopia and Djibouti scores a 5 on both political freedom and civil rights, while Eritrea manages to score 7 and 6 respectively – there is still considerable room for improvement. The members of the upper chamber of parliament, the House of Elders (Guurti), for example, have repeatedly extended their own terms of office. Corruption, while not as insidious as elsewhere in Africa, nonetheless needs to be systematically combated; while President Kahin deserves credit for sacking a number of corrupt officials during his tenure, the fact that they were even in place at all and needed to be removed is still disconcerting. While Somaliland is a largely homogenous society, there are nonetheless a few very small minority communities whose concerns could also be better addressed in the overall political process.

Third, while President Kahin expressed the willingness of Somaliland to work with U.S. regional counterterrorism efforts during his meetings with Defense Department officials in Washington last month – and legal avenues for such cooperation need to be found on the American side – Hargeysa must redouble its efforts on the anti-extremism front. And while government agencies on the American side may have unresolved issues with certain types of engagements with their Somaliland counterparts, nothing prevents the latter from more increasing the quantity and quality of intelligence which they share. This would be particularly helpful since American military and intelligence officials have very limited access to reliable information from southern Somalia, an area where Somalilanders not only are better positioned to operate, but in fact already do so extensively. While I realize that this proposal shifts the burden somewhat to Somaliland, it is, after all, Somalilanders who are trying to make a case for partnership with the United States. (For their part, American officials would do well to shift responsibility for matters relating to Somaliland from the U.S. embassy in Kenya to the one in Ethiopia given that while there are no direct connections between Hargeysa and Nairobi, Somaliland officials and civilians routinely pass through Addis Ababa en route to other destinations.)

Fourth, it is no secret that the former Somalia has significant potential natural resources. Last summer, I reported on how the People's Republic of China was making a play for the oil in TFG President Abdillahi Yusuf's home turf. There is every reason to believe that similar wealth is to be found not only on Somaliland's territory, but also in its waters. While every state (and aspiring state) has the right to make such commercial arrangements as it deems most advantageous – there are reports of the Swedish-based Lundin Petroleum AB (owned, since 2001, by Canada's Talisman Energy) had approached Somaliland's Ministry of Water and Minerals for rights to oil and natural gas exploration – authorities in Hargeysa would do well to consider the long-term strategic implications of their decisions as well as the economic benefits. Even if their foreign policy elites were not generally divorced from the interests of their business classes, neither Sweden nor Canada would likely be much of a strategic ally for anyone, much less a nascent state in a dangerous neighborhood like the one Somaliland finds itself in. In contrast, as Walter Russell Mead and other scholars have pointed out, there is a long tradition of American business and government working in tandem, with the latter often following the former's lead and U.S. political interests adjusting themselves to advance the economic interests of its citizens. Not only should the government in Hargeysa be open to approaches by American firms, but it ought to actively court them, realizing that without significant commercial ties to the United States, any political relations – if they come about at all – will be very tenuous. Conversely, the presence of American business interests, especially in strategic sectors, reinforces the geopolitical case for diplomatic ties between Washington and Hargeysa.

Commenting on Somaliland, I.M. Lewis, the British scholar who for half a century has been the preeminent authority on the Somali peoples, observed: "The overall achievement so far as truly remarkable, and all the more so in that it has been accomplished by the people of Somaliland themselves with very little external help or intervention. The contrast with the fate of southern Somalia hardly needs to be underlined." For these two reasons, among others, it is hoped that Somaliland will take the steps necessary to take advantage of the momentum in favor of advancing ties with its natural strategic partner, the United States, to the next level.

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C., as well as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).

Source:World Defense Review

http://somalilandtimes.net/sl/2008/319/17.shtml

Tuesday, 19 February 2008

Somaliland: On The Road To Independent Statehood?

By J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.

December 13th, 2007

In October, in my testimony to a House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health hearing on security in the Horn of Africa, I stated:

The most significant national interest at stake for the United States in this complex context is to prevent al-Qaeda (or another like-minded international terrorist network) from acquiring a new base and opening a new front in its war against us and our allies…

I would be remiss if I did not avail myself of this opportunity to raise the question of the remarkable reemergence of the Republic of Somaliland amid the ruin of Somalia and multiple conflicts wracking the Horn of Africa. With the collapse of the Somali state, the Somalilanders reasserted their independence and created a functional government, complete with all the accoutrements of modern statehood save, alas, international recognition…

Surely if America’s national commitment to support and strengthen democracy as a bulwark against extremist ideologies and terrorist violence has any real-world application, it is certainly the case here. The point I made at last year’s hearing on the expanding crisis in the Horn of Africa is even truer today: “The people of Somaliland have made their choice for political independence and democratic progress. While they have stumbled occasionally along the way, their efforts deserve encouragement through the appropriate economic, political, and security cooperation-which, in turn, will anchor Somaliland within America’s orbit as well as international society.”

I make no apologies for constantly returning to this theme: it is to me incomprehensible that we continue to express concern about the state of democracy in the Horn of Africa while all but ignoring a New York-sized region that has held internationally-monitored elections for the presidency as well as national and local legislatures. Talk of mixed signals!

Last week, in its December 4 th issue, the Washington Post carried a remarkable article by Ann Scott Tyson. Under the headline “U.S. Debating Shift of Support in Somali Conflict,” the piece notes that “ the escalating conflict in Somalia is generating debate inside the Bush administration over whether the United States should continue to back the shaky transitional government in Mogadishu or shift support to the less volatile region of Somaliland, which declared independence in 1991” and quotes two anonymous Department of Defense officials:

“Somaliland is an entity that works,” a senior defense official said. “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place because they’re not a recognized state,” the official said.

The Pentagon’s view is that “ Somaliland should be independent,” another defense official said. “We should build up the parts that are functional and box in” Somalia’s unstable regions, particularly around Mogadishu.

In contrast, “the State Department wants to fix the broken part first-that’s been a failed policy,” the official said.

In conclusion, Navy Captain Bob Wright, head of strategic communications for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, was quoted as saying “ We’d love to [engage Somaliland], we’re just waiting for State to give us the okay.”

The next day, December 5 th, the Bureau of African Affairs posted to the State Department website a five-bullet point “fact sheet” attempting to explain what passes as “United States Policy on Somaliland”:

  • The United States currently engages the Somaliland administration and has provided assistance, for example to the election effort. Our policy on recognition is to allow the African Union to first deliberate on the question. We do not want to get ahead of the continental organization on an issue of such importance.
  • As indicated in the full quote above, the United States continues to engage with the administration in Somaliland on a range of issues, most directly Somaliland’s continued progress towards democratization and economic development.
  • In FY 2007, the United States provided a total of $1 million through the International Republican Institute to support training for parliamentarians and other key programs in preparations for the upcoming municipal and presidential elections in Somaliland. We expect to provide an additional $1.5 million in continued support for the democratization process in Somaliland following the elections.
  • While we continue to engage with the Somaliland administration, we do believe that the African Union is the most appropriate forum to address the question of recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. We understand that Somaliland is pursuing bilateral dialogue with the African Union and its member-states in this regard.
  • However, as the African Union continues to deliberate on this issue, the United States will continue to engage with all actors throughout Somalia, including Somaliland, to support the return of lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

On the face of it, the Foggy Bottom’s position seems reasonable enough: the United States does not want to be blamed for opening up a veritable Pandora’s Box by backing a secessionist attempt to redraw colonial-era boundaries in Africa which could cause a ripple effect across the continent; better to let the African Union make that call. However, the artful facade the diplomats put up to cover their geopolitical inertia is utterly mendacious, despite the truly diplomatic efforts of Somaliland Foreign Minister Abdillahi Duale to welcome the State Department’s positive comments about the country’s “continued progress towards democratization and economic development.

First, as I pointed out in this column nearly two years ago: “ From 1884 until 1960, Somaliland existed within its current borders as the protectorate of British Somaliland. On June 26, 1960, Somaliland was granted its independence by the British Crown and was internationally recognized as a sovereign state. When, a week later, the United Nations trust territory that had been the Italian colony of Somalia received its independence, Somaliland joined it to form a united republic. The union, however, was troubled from the beginning…Amid the anarchy that ensued following Siyad Barre’s ignominious flight in January 1991, clan elders in Somaliland issued a declaration reasserting the independence that the northwestern region had briefly enjoyed in 1960.” There is no question of - much less precedent set for - redrawing colonial frontiers.

Second, the African Union (AU) itself has acknowledged the unique circumstances surrounding Somaliland’s quest for recognition. The official report of an AU fact-finding mission to the republic in 2005 led by AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka concluded: “ The fact that the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990, makes Somaliland’s search for recognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history. Objectively viewed, the case should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s Box’. As such, the AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case.”

However, by punting the question to a body like the AU, which decides major political questions by consensus, while simultaneously continuing the delusional policy of recognizing the utterly ineffectual “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) of Somalia, which asserts sovereignty over the entire territory of the defunct Somali Democratic Republic despite being unable to so much as control its putative capital, the State Department belies any pretensions of neutrality. The Africa Bureau knows very well that there is no way the phantasmal TFG will ever permit an AU consensus to be forged which recognizes the de facto Republic of Somaliland. Thus the State Department’s support for the fictional Somalia’s continued presence at international forums like the AU is fundamentally irreconcilable with functional Somaliland’s ever getting a fair hearing. So the only thing conceivably worse than the State Department being cynically duplicitous in its Somaliland policy is the possibility that its denizens don’t realize this and, hence, are criminally incompetent in their guidance of U.S. policy in the geopolitical sensitive Horn of Africa.

Fortunately, the TFG may not be a factor for much longer. Last week, its “president,” Abdillahi Yusuf, was hospitalized in Nairobi, Kenya, and had to cancel a meeting in Addis Ababa with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; should his condition worsen, that charade will be over. The meeting that did take place between TFG “prime minister” Nur Hassan Hussein and America’s top diplomat was farcical to anyone with historical knowledge of the region. The secretary said she hoped “ Hussein will draw on his humanitarian background to facilitate delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid.”

What “humanitarian background” does Dr. Rice refer to? His role as police colonel under the brutal dictatorship of Muhammad Siyad Barre? His tenure as deputy head of the despot’s “ National Salvation Court,” a military tribunal that sent thousands of regime opponents to their deaths? Or perhaps his leadership of the Somali Red Crescent Society where he “did well by doing good” - so well, in fact, that as Somalia descended into chaos and its luckier citizens fled, his children inexplicably found the capital to open a string of internet cafés and currency exchanges in Great Britain to meet the needs of their displaced countrymen? And while the secretary could only “ encourage” the self-appointed TFG “ to develop a timeline for the remainder of the transitional process by early January” in the hope of staging elections sometime in 2009, Somaliland has already held several sets of the internationally-monitored free polls, the most recent, the parliamentary elections of 2005, was observed and reported on by an International Republican Institute (IRI) delegation led by Ambassador Lange Schermerhorn, a former U.S. envoy to Djibouti who has also served as political advisor to the CJTF-HOA. (I served as an election observer with the ambassador in Nigeria earlier this year.)

The failure of the TFG should not be surprising. As I pointed out a year and a half ago, the pretender regime is little more than the product of a well-intentioned effort by the international community to conjure up yet another government for Somalia after the ignominious collapse the previous year of its previous attempt, the risible “Transitional National Government” (TNG), which went through four prime ministers and hundreds of cabinet members in three years before going bankrupt, having misappropriated millions of dollars in donor funds while governing nothing other than what was inside the confines of the four walls of “president” Abdiqasim Salad Hassan’s villa in nearby Djibouti. With even fewer prospects and, if it is possible, even less legitimacy than the TNG, the TFG’s leaders have little incentive to do anything other than leverage the international recognition which is their only real asset with which to enrich themselves.

One could hardly find a starker contrast to this than Somaliland. As former World Bank economist William Easterly, hardly someone who looks at Africa through rosy lenses, noted in his realistic, if somewhat pessimistic, volume, “The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”:

In Somalia, the “international community” has sponsored fourteen rounds of fruitless peace talks since the collapse of the government in 1991, not to mention the failed UN/U.S. military intervention. Meanwhile, without outside intervention, foreign aid, or even international recognition, the breakaway Republic of Somaliland in the north of Somalia has enjoyed peace, economic growth, and democratic elections over the same period.

Thus, among the many others which could be adduced, there are five compelling reasons for the United States to abandon the bankrupt, State Department-driven policy of preferring self-appointed “leaders” of a failed construct to an effective government of a real country:

  • Counterterrorism . As the Pentagon has now publicly acknowledged (and as I suggested earlier this year), scarce resources would be better spent boxing in the troubled parts of Somalia, rather than vainly asserting the questionable claims by a clearly unpopular regime whose illegitimacy is actually a magnet for extremists. No less a figure than Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates declared last week while visiting Camp Lemonier that his “ biggest concern for Somalia is the potential for al-Qaeda to be active there.” Formal ties with Somaliland would permit closer ties between U.S. military and intelligence personnel with their counterparts in the small country’s services. Access to Somaliland territory, including the onetime NATO installation at Berbera, would also expand the scope for counterterrorism and other operations by CJTF-HOA as well as the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) which will subsume it next year.
  • Regional stability. Far from being destabilizing, as I told Congress earlier this year, recognition of Somaliland would “ show the countries and peoples of the sub-region our resolve to reward progress as well as give the lie to those who argue that our anti-terrorism and pro-democracy objectives are not subterfuges for an anti-Muslim agenda. (Somaliland’s population is almost exclusively Sunni Muslims and the shahâdah , the Muslim profession of the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as God’s final prophet, is emblazoned on its flag.)” Furthermore, U.S.-led diplomatic recognition of Somaliland would not only allow the country much-needed access to international institutions and finance for development of the country itself, but also spur regional integration and prosperity. To cite just one example, America’s close partner Ethiopia, whose cut-off from the sea is a factor in the border dispute with Eritrea which I discussed two weeks ago, would benefit directly from access to Somaliland’s 900-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Aden.
  • Natural resources and economic opportunities . Earlier this year, I reported on mainland China’s play for petroleum resources in Somalia. Establishing formal ties with Somaliland would not only open opportunities for American firms to bid for similar concessions in that country, but also to invest in what could be a significant regional market. Conversely, ties with American commercial interests would also help anchor the strategically-placed country in the orbit of the United States as it joins the global economy. On the other hand, Somaliland’s considerable potential for economic and social progress is jeopardized not only by the maelstrom in neighboring Somalia, but also, as the AU has reported, by “ the lack of recognition [which] ties the hands of the authorities and people of Somaliland as they cannot effectively and sustainably transact with the outside to pursue the reconstruction and development goals.”
  • Moral imperatives. As I previously argued, “ Somaliland’s trajectory…has been nothing if not extraordinary, being characterized by both social stability and democratic politics-the northern region’s progress standing in stark contrast to the free fall of the rest of the former Somalia. And despite being cut off from international financial institutions, direct bilateral assistance, and other sources of development and investment capital-all for want of diplomatic recognition-the Somalilanders have rebuilt Hargeysa, which was leveled during the Siyad Barre regime’s brutal campaign against them, and resettled close to one million of their displaced citizens.” Somaliland has already had democratic presidential, legislative, and local government elections; even the State Department has acknowledged that its upcoming presidential and municipal elections are more than credible enough to deserve U.S. funding.
  • Global leadership. Despite some major faux pas of American foreign policy in recent years - both in substance and implementation - the world still defaults to looking to the United States to take the lead in critical arenas like the Horn of Africa. A number of governments, both African (including those of Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Zambia) and European (including those of Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden), have either entered into de facto relations with or at least made friendly overtures to the Republic of Somaliland. In June, the German federal parliament even passed a resolution calling upon Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government “ to work towards mitigating dangers for Somaliland’s stability that may arise from the current Southern Somali scenario,” including “ initiatives to advance the resolution of the question of an international recognition of an independent Somaliland.” However, nothing is likely to advance without American leadership or at least tacit approval - in any event, the opposite of the State Department’s passive attendance on the AU’s capacity-challenged policymaking and implementation processed (see my column last week on “The Challenge of Peacekeeping in Africa”).

At the very launch of this column series, I wrote: “ Since the disintegration of the Siyad Barre’s oppressive Somali regime into Hobbesian anarchy and warlordism, the international community has staunchly defended the phantasmal existence of the fictitious entity known as ‘ Somalia.’ Now, however, is the time for the United States to break ranks and let realism triumph over wishful thinking, not only recognizing, but actively supporting Somaliland, a brave little land whose people’s quest for freedom and security mirrors America’s values as well as her strategic interests.” If anything, that counsel is even truer today than ever before, as many of our military officers have now publicly acknowledged. The only question is whether or not America’s elected political leaders will have the vision and fortitude to finally instruct their unelected diplomatic mandarins on the real stakes: diplomatic, military, and economic.

FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor J. Peter Pham is Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is also an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C., as well as Vice President of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA).

http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=1385868#

Source: FamilySecurityMatters

http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2007/308/05.shtml