by Patrick Lineberry
The Horn of Africa has long been vacillating between the outbreak of conflict and repressed tension both within these countries Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and across their borders.
On a recent trip to Ethiopia I somehow became involved in the struggle of Somaliland, and I am now working with the Somaliland government and the Somaliland lobby in the US Somaliland Policy and Reconstruction Institute (SOPRI) for the international recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.
Even though it effectively functions as a sovereign state, international recognition would be the most beneficial step toward stability in Somalia and the Horn, and eventually African unity, contrary to the belief of many scholars.
Since the issue has started to peak its head into the international news scene, I have been confronted with a number of serious questions which, if answered insufficiently, would make life much harder for Somalilanders and those fighting for Somaliland's independence. To sum it up, are Somaliland's problems big enough to jeopardize its future and the Horn after gaining independence?
Supporters of Somaliland's independence have argued that its democratic record along with its respect for civil liberties are the best in the Horn and a contender among the best in Africa, which is true .
However, that may not be good enough. A few critics see Somaliland as a "tinderbox waiting to explode", alleging that its multiparty democracy is being subordinated by clanism, without any concrete proof, which is one of the key factors that deprives the Transitional Federal Government of legitimacy and perpetuates anarchy in Southern Somalia. Also illuminated has been Somaliland's recent jailing (but relatively prompt release) of party leaders.
Supporters also welcome the stabilizing effect that Somaliland's independence will have over Somalia and the Horn of Africa and maintain that Somaliland's fate depends on further efforts toward state-building, primarily that the state increasingly supports broad social interests.
Now it's time to consider the alternatives. First, we can leave Somaliland to the African Union, which has already executed a fact-finding mission suggesting the issue be brought to the floor for a vote. But with the African Union so divided between northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa there is no incentive for members to pursue Somaliland's independence.
Also, the broad African trend of national power consolidation further inhibits state interaction, and right-wing Muslim-African states threatened by the potential of a moderate Islamic state have incentive not to pursue Somaliland's independence.
Tensions could remain and will probably increase between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia, despite the internationally-recognized TFG, and the AU will continue to be polarized on such important issues as this, demonstrating its inability to address critical African issues, if even to forego regional differences and uniting to condemn Somaliland's independence.
The time for African Union leadership may have passed and the issue will continue to stagnate if left alone. AU leadership is thwarted, some argue, by the maintenance of the oligarchic state. But just as Somaliland has a unique candidacy for recognition so is its potential in African unity. Somaliland's fiercely egalitarian society coupled with what may be called at least a semblance of democracy which is more than any other country in the Horn can muster still make it the best candidate not only for building peace and stability in the Horn but for advancing US interests throughout Africa.
At the moment it remains the best policy choice for the US in Africa, abroad, and in the War on Terror because its gains far outweigh the risks.
The AU will not be in a position of unity to act effectively on any issue for some time unless powers outside Africa help with Somaliland's recognition. The political problems in Africa and Somalia stem from oligarchy and anarchy, respectively, both of which keep fellow Africans at a distance from one another and provide more fertile grounds for Islamism without effective redistribution of wealth and little outlet for expression.
Recognizing and partnering with Somaliland legitimizes the alternatives to oligarchy and anarchy and would inspire hope for democracy and liberty at least in the Horn. It would show that the US and the West are interested in providing legitimate opportunities for poor Muslim countries that are threatened by radical Islam.
International recognition will give Somaliland resources, accountability, and backing to improve its record and represent humanity to the region, to the African continent, and to the Arab world.
Now let's consider what will happen if other international powers, such as the US, enter into the picture. If the US took the initiative of establishing diplomatic ties with Somaliland this would put much more pressure on the AU to consider the issue either way, to go against it or to support it.
African states care about what others do in Africa. And because the US and the West do not want to be seen as neo-colonial powers, then meaningful multilateral talks between Somaliland and other African countries will happen, effectively leaving Somaliland to establish diplomatic ties with other African countries on its own terms and not those of the US.
A recognized Somaliland would be able to confront other right-wing Islamist states, especially those in Africa. Like Turkey, Somaliland is a secular, democratic state that straddles two continental regions, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Somaliland has the ability to play a unique role in African and Arab affairs, promoting the case for human freedom while understanding the Muslim and African perspective. Just as Turkey is helping to manage the conflict in Iraq, Somaliland would be able to contribute a similar role in regional conflict.
Just as well another secular, democratic, Muslim state could be the beginning of such an alliance that could have sway over other Muslim countries and that is not so hostile to the West. And it should go without mentioning Somaliland's immediate role in helping curb radical Islam in southern Somalia increasingly referred to as the "third front" in the War on Terror by additional US support and the existence of legitimate stability next door.
The worst-case scenario is that the Horn will resume conflict. It could either be between northern and southern Somalis or between a united Somalia and surrounding countries where there are still Somali irredentist claims. The latter, however, is not likely given that a united Somalia would have to take the form of some kind of confederation, thus making it more stable and its foreign policy more deliberate.
A confederal Somalia would not disturb its neighbors; a unitary Somalia has and would. It is still possible that southern Somalia, as well as the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, would engage in conflict.
But with Somaliland representing the only recognized and potent force in Somali territory, it would have the upper hand. Just as well, jihad from southern Somalia has only been declared on Ethiopia and would not be declared on a completely Muslim state so, radical Islam does not pose a threat to relations between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia, and Somaliland has not provoked nor been aggressive toward southern Somalia.
The key is recognizing that while southern Somalis are largely divided it is largely the result of external forces (i.e. political Islam from the Middle East, Eritrea fighting a proxy war with Ethiopia in Somalia, and the international legitimacy given to the unpopular and ineffective TFG). If southern Somalia were to unite then that sense of Somali brotherhood will have trumped conflict as a means of resolution and peace in the region.
And it is still possible, but very unlikely given all that Somaliland has achieved within the last seventeen years without any major assistance, that upon independence Somaliland could squander its resources and itself become part of the Somali legacy of being a collapsed state. This possibility certainly exists, but it doesn't seem likely.
Considering that Somaliland will only enter into negotiations with Somalia as equally recognized states, these are necessary trials in order for peace to begin to be restored in the Horn of Africa.
What an independent Somaliland can offer is the final piece of the African puzzle for Africa and for the US. After Somaliland there will be no other African nations that have a legal right for recognition. For one, this will allow the AU the energy to solve other issues. Moreover though, at the least it will provide the US with another ally in the Horn that will prove to be more preferable than with the TFG.
Africa has shown its tendency toward oligarchy and repressive regimes, even under the guise of democracy. Somaliland does come with baggage that might require improvements considering the responsibilities the international community has shown toward recognized countries.
But leaving it to the AU is not a viable option. The US should also consider its tarnished reputation in the Muslim world, having directly torn Afghanistan and Iraq apart and indirectly southern Somalia, all to the avail of little or no progress. Many European countries have been deliberating over recognizing Somaliland for years and have sent envoys to investigate its case.
The US should spearhead this opportunity to restore its reputation in the Muslim world by becoming involved with a Muslim country (whose case is very good, though not perfect, for advancing the cause of democracy) without an ominous military overtone. It should also ally with like-minded world powers to restore its respect for truly multilateral efforts by working through international bodies such as the AU and by recognizing the place of international conventions, which in fact support Somaliland's independence.
The consequences of complacency justify doing something about the Somaliland question. Otherwise, Somaliland could become involved in a bitter turmoil with southern Somalia, similar to its experience with the oppressive Barre regime in the 1980s and 90s. The AU would not pursue further unity. Also, the US could be one big step closer to losing the War on Terror.
Source:Helium
http://www.helium.com/tm/808050/africa-vacillating-between-outbreak